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Introduction
The field of global communication studies has yet to come to terms with changes
in the global media environment that began with the advent of the Internet and
accelerated with the rise of mobile devices, social networking media, and usergenerated content. These developments pose a radical challenge to the
theoretical

frameworks

communication

that

have

traditionally

dominated

international

scholarship, if only because serious attempts to capture

contemporary media dynamics require us to leave behind the meta-theoretical
frameworks of modernization, dependency and globalization, and focus sharply
on case-studies that yield insight about context-bound communication processes
and their social and political implications. Indeed, we argue in this essay,
whereas television was the default and often unstated fulcrum of much of global
communication

theory, the emergent

global media environment

is best

understood as a transnational “hypermedia space” (see Kraidy, 2006) in which
so-called “old” media like television and the newspaper join emergent media like
mobile devices, social media, video on the Internet, and others to create a
communication space the social and political implications of which we are only
beginning to discern.
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In this brief essay we purport to tease out some of the theoretical implications of
the emergence of digital culture for global communication studies. To that end,
we use the Middle East not as a “container” where we can capture distinct
hypermedia dynamics, but rather as an optic on the changing nature of global
communication in the digital age. It is our hope that the case studies we discuss
hold insights applicable beyond the contemporary Middle East. Therefore it is our
objective to point the discussion into a comparative direction with broad
relevance to global communication studies. With that in mind, we first explicate
the notion of hypermedia space, then we move forward to look at the role of
hypermedia space in political upheaval in Lebanon in 2005 and Iran in 2009, and
finally we conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of these two
cases for global communication studies. Before we describe and analyze the
case-studies,

let

us

clarify

what

we

mean

by

hypermedia

space.

1. Defining Hypermedia Space
Though the term hypermedia has been in use for a long time, we credit our use
of the term to the Canadian international relations theorist Ronald Deibert (1997)
who argues that the term “hypermedia”:
… not only captures the convergence of discrete technologies, it also suggests
the massive penetration and ubiquity of electronic media characteristic of the
new communications environment … the prefix “hyper” (meaning “over” or
“above”) emphasizes two central characteristics of that environment: the speed
by which communications currently take place, and the intertextuality or
interoperatibility of once-discrete media … linked together into a single seamless
web of digital-electronic-telecommunications”(pp. 114-115).

Though Deibert formulated his ideas on hypermedia before the advent of
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, it is clear that these new developments
reinforce the ease and fluidity with which digitized information moves between
various media. Mobile telephony, tweets, email, social networks, text messaging,
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digital cameras, online videos, electronic newspapers, and satellite television
thus constitute a fluid communicative environment: hypermedia space.
Clearly, the new media environment described in the preceding paragraph has
implications for social and political communication. The advent of hypermedia
space constitutes a qualitative leap in the ways that people seek, access,
produce, and react to information. Most importantly, hypermedia space broadens
access to the means of communication, since it is obviously easier for average
people to “produce” messages today in the era of mobile devices and blogs than
it was in the days of state-owned broadcasting, telephone landlines, and the daily
newspaper delivered to the door or purchased at the store. The new media
environment is therefore more participatory. As a result, since communication
processes flow in several directions, and since the roles of producer and receiver
of information have been scrambled, and since more people are now
theoretically able to shape a message, then we can expect a multiplicity of
discourses to arise in public culture.
Since some of these discourses will have rival objectives, reflect competing
agendas and carry conflicting ideologies, the new media environment fosters
contention in the public sphere. Clearly, a variety of media “speaking” to each
other do not and cannot alone trigger contentious political communication.
However, when a context is rife with social and political tensions, and when
social agents are willing and able to use hypermedia space with the objective of
inducing change in the social or political status quo, then the availability of
hypermedia space can play a crucial role in the performance of contention
communication in public discourse. The cases of Lebanon in 2005 and Iran in
2009 have the three elements mentioned above: (1) a socio-political context
riddled with tensions, both internal to the Lebanese and Iranian polities, but also
induced by foreign intervention and global geopolitics; (2) groups of people,
mostly but not only students and young activists, agitating for systemic change,
willing to take risks to reach that objective, and savvy with the use of hypermedia,
and (3) the availability, even abundance, of mobile devices, digital cameras,
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access to the Internet, and therefore to social networking (i.e. Facebook) and
video (i.e. YouTube) sites and. Finally, as the case of Lebanon illustrates,
popular culture—in this case reality television—can be recruited via hypermedia
space for political ends. These developments, as our concluding section makes
clear, have potentially profound implications for global communication studies.

2. Lebanon’s Independence Intifada
After a car bomb killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in Beirut,
on February 14, 2005, television emerged as a crucial political forum. Haririowned Future TV, hitherto known for is largely apolitical programming grid,
became a full-time political machine, celebrating Hariri’s legacy, accusing the
Syrian regime of having ordered the assassination, and keeping a focus on the
UN investigation into Hariri’s murder. Future TV talk-shows featured many antiSyrian speakers while specially commissioned music videos asking for “The
Truth” were repeatedly aired between programmes. LBC, politically sympathetic
to Hariri’s political line, focused on the assassination only for a few days before
returning to its regular programming mix of entertainment and news, avoiding the
negative financial consequences of wall-to-wall coverage of the assassination.
Whereas Future TV and LBC were critical of the Syrian regime and favorable to
US and European intervention, two other leading Lebanese channels New TV
known for its criticism of Hariri’s policies, and Hizbullah’s Al-Manar reflected a
different view, one opposed to Western interference and suspicious of U.S. and
Israeli agendas. Without explicitly supporting Syrian involvement in Lebanon,
both channels refrained from criticizing the Syrian regime and both were critical
of the UN investigation. New Television and al-Manar challenged Future TV LBC,
with New Television propounding the secular version while Al-Manar put forth a
religiously inflected version of events (Kraidy, 2009).
As analyzed in-depth elsewhere (most of the discussion of the Lebanon case is
drawn from Kraidy, 2009), the genre of programming known as “reality
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television,” which features non-scripted amateur events and competitions whose
outcome is determines by viewer voting via text-messages or through the
Internet, was thoroughly politicized in the Middle East. With a production and
dramatic logic that makes television shows dependent on other media, reality
television programs can, under the right social circumstances,

activate

hypermedia space. Indeed, the assassination of Hariri triggered demonstrations
in downtown Beirut, known as the “Independence Intifada,” that indicate that
participatory activities called for by reality television programs like LBC’s Star
Academy—voting by mobile phone, using text-messaging to build alliances and
promote contestants, and in subsequent years, constructing Facebook fan
pages, etc—can have real political applications.
Indeed, in 2005 Beirut demonstrators used mobile phones, television and
vocabulary from reality television programs in ways that suggests that the
combination of hypermedia space and popular culture can have a powerful
impact on public life. For example, demonstrators brandished signs using the
language of reality television, as was clear in the large March 14, 2005,
“opposition” demonstration clamoring for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from
Lebanon and the resignation of Lebanon’s pro-Syrian political and security
leadership. Consider a hand-made, English-language sign carried by a
demonstrator: the words “Lahoud Nominee” (referring to Lebanese President
Emile Lahoud, whose term was illegitimately extended by Syrian fiat) sit atop the
exhortation “call 1559” (in reference to the United Nations resolution calling for
the withdrawal from Lebanon of Syrian troops and intelligence operatives). The
sign replicates weekly reality television rituals with which a vast number of Arab
viewers are familiar. It is therefore able to articulate a media-savvy political
agenda in an age of attention scarcity, constituting attractive footage for the
repetitive news cycle of Arab and Western news channels alike.
Reality television was instrumentalized for politics not only on the street but also
in television studios. On LBC, a Star Academy rehearsal was interrupted live to
announce Hariri’s death. Then LBC went into a week of mourning, following it
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with a prime time Friday evening episode in which contestants hailing from
throughout the Arab world sang patriotic Lebanese songs against the backdrop
of a huge Lebanese flag, ultimately booting out the … Syrian contestant in an
eerily politicized atmosphere. This event in the studio echoed the resignation of
Omar Karamé, then Lebanon’s pro-Syrian prime minister, under pressure from
demonstrators on the street. Clearly, US, French and Saudi support protected
the Beirut demonstrations from direct repression, and media coverage played a
crucial role in sustaining the rallies.
Nonetheless, the demonstrators did not take external support for granted, but
courted it aggressively, staging visually attractive spectacles and using Englishlanguage signs. The demonstrators’ message of national unity was visually
underscored by the omnipresence of the Lebanese national flag. Media and
public relations professionals organized a human Lebanese flag made of 10,000
people holding cardboard squares painted in white, green or red. The Beirut
demonstrators took pictures with their mobile phones’ digital cameras and
transmitted to bloggers who uploaded them on friendly websites and to
mainstream news media. The Hizbollah-organized rival demonstration was also
festooned with Lebanese flags. The role of strategic communication experts
notwithstanding, the demonstrations expressed genuine feelings of grief and
popular anger at the system, and journalistic coverage was not entirely passive
or acquiescent.
A communicative chain of mobile phones, email and television was used
effectively to create fluid and interactive communication processes that eluded
control. Clearly, the actual use of hypermedia space depends on political context,
availability of technology infrastructure, and most importantly, people willing to
use various connected media for specific social or political purposes. When the
Lebanese army established checkpoints around central Beirut to prevent
demonstrators from reaching public spaces, soldiers at some checkpoints were
clearly unwilling to use force to send demonstrators back on their tracks, a
nugget of information that was immediately “blasted” via text messages, allowing
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demonstra tors to converge on checkpoints where soldiers or commanding
officers appeared sympathetic to their cause. At other checkpoints, young
women put flowers in soldiers’ hands, thus “disarming” them and helping flows of
men and women alerted via text-messaging “blasts” to reach designated protest
areas (Kraidy personal communications with demonstrators, June-August 2005).

3. Iran’s Green Movement
On June 20, 2009, a young Iranian woman was shot in the chest on a street in
the Iranian capital Tehran during one of the post-election protests pitting
students, activists and a newly visible political opposition to the forces of the
Iranian regime. A witness captured the woman’s last moments on a mobile
phone camera and uploaded the footage on YouTube. The 40-second video
shows the young woman collapse on the pavement, a pool of blood spreading
beneath her body, and blood coming out of her nose and mouth, her eyes open
and staring at the camera. Two men kneel next to her, pressing on her chest.
One of them is screami ng out her name, Neda. The now viral video was picked
up by social media such as Facebook as well as mainstream media
organizations. The BBC and CNN were among the many stations that broadcast
the video. The dying woman was identified as 26 year-old Neda Agha Soltan.
Her killing occurred during one of the many demonstrations against the election
to presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, accusing the president and the
government of fraud and contesting election results. The Iranian government
militia, Basij, was publicly accused of the murder of Neda and others who died
during the protests (Fletcher, August 20, 2009; Press TV, June 29, 2009;
Weaver, July 1, 2009).
In November 2009, 5 months after the contested Iranian presidential elections,
the British Broadcast ing Corporation released a documentary film titled “Neda:
An Iranian Martyr.” In one camera shot, we see the mother of Neda kneeling
beside her daughter’s grave. In the same frame we can also see her through the
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mobile phone screens of two young women standing at the grave site and filming
the scene (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v =C4-iLG6FwRc). The viewer can see
BBC footage copied from a CNN camera capturing an image of mobile phone
screens showing the image of Neda’s mourning mother. That all this can be seen
in a YouTube video adds yet another layer to this inter-media configuration; it
constitutes an additional node in the hypermedia chain that developed around
Iran’s “Green Movement” in 2009.
Whereas Lebanon’s 2005 “Independence Intifada” saw the rise of textmessaging as a political tool, Iran’s 2009 “Green Movement,” propelled Twitter
onto the global consciousness through myriad news reports that depicted Twitter
as a qualitatively different and radically effective tool in the contentious politics
unfolding on the streets of Tehran. Neda was killed on a Saturday evening. By
Sunday morning, she was the fifth most commented topic on Twitter (Putz, June
22, 2009). By Monday, there were 6, 860 entries for her on the Persian language
Google website (Fathi, June 23, 2009). At the time of writing, a Google search of
‘Neda Agha Soltan’ yielded 1,680,000 results. A YouTube video showing her
dying moments had 702,793 views. In post-elections Iran, mobile phones,
emails, and social networking sites constitute the nodes of a hypermedia chain
that turned stories, such as Neda’s death, into international events. Newspaper
columnists and online journalists talked about a “Twitter Revolution,” of Twitter
being the “medium of the movement” (Grossman, June 17, 2009) and a “player in
Iran’s drama” (Musgrove, June 17, 2009), of Iranians “taking their protest online”
(Nasr, June 14, 2009).
In fact, as social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter saw a flood of news
and images about the events unfolding in Iran, Twitter, a two-year old free social
networking

and micro-blogging service, became

the primary

source of

information for many outside Iran, especially after the media blackout that
followed the expulsion of foreign correspondents and the state detention of
photographers, journalists and documentary filmmakers after the June elections [1]
(Committee to Protect Journalists, July 30, 2009; CNN, June 16, 2009). The
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Iranian government also restricted foreign media’s coverage by banning
reporters from the streets and limiting them to work from their offices (Plunkett,
June 16, 2009). Twitter thus emerged as a medium providing eyewitness
accounts from street demonstrations when such accounts were hard to provide
by journalists. Twitter enables its users to send and receive messages known as
tweets that cannot exceed 140 characters. In their “About Us” section of their
website, Twitter creators assert that “mobile has been in our DNA right from the
start: The 140 character limit originated so tweets could be sent as mobile text
messages which have a limit of 160 characters. Minus 20 characters for author
attribution, this gives users just enough room” (http://www.twitter.com ). Twitter
and mobile phones are then linked from the onset. The creators continue,
“Twitter is the evolution of mobile messaging, not replacing SMS, IM, or email but
introducing a new public dimension to messaging” (twitter.com, 2010).
One of the main features of Twitter is the hashtag. As indicated in the name, this
consists of placing the hash (#) sign in front of keywords. Hashtags were
developed to create groupings on Twitter and make it easier to follow certain
topics. They are “community -driven convention for adding context and metadata
to

your

tweets”

(Twitter

Fan

Wiki,

http://twitter.pbworks.com/Hashtags ).

According to the same website, hashtags were made famous during the San
Diego forest fires in 2007 when blogger Nate Ritter used the hashtag
"#sandiegofire" to identify his disaster-related updates. Twitter’s track feature and
the development of the website hashtag.org made it possible to index and track
the most discussed topics or “trends” and their frequency. Even non-Twitter
users can subscribe to the RSS feed of their chosen hashtag, receive updates
from twitter to their news reader of choice (Google Reader for example), and
follow the conversation. The most popular hashtags created around the Iranian
elections and the Green Movement are #Iran, #IranElection [2], #gr88 (a
contraction of Green Revolution 1388, the Iranian calendar year in which the
elections were held) and #Neda. This brings us back to the video of the slain
young woman which, once captured on mobile phone, was made available on

9

Kraidy & Mourad

Lessons from the Middle East

GMJ

YouTube and quickly picked up by twitterers who posted comments as well as
links to the video and related pictures. But twitterers were not simple receivers as
they made sure to create their own campaigns; one of which is the #CNNfail in
response to the American news organization’s poor coverage of the Tehran
protests. Twitter users were acting as media watchdogs; not only were they
providing information, but they were also demanding more from the mainstream
media.
Global, especially American, news organizations looked at images coming out of
Iran as proofs of the power of “new” media technologies to “democratize”
authoritarian environments, and many observers have claimed that these media
now play a crucial role in social movements and revolutions (Libresco, June 16,
2009; Shirky). Such coverage reflects an ignorance of previous episodes of
political contention when then “small” non-mainstream media played an important
role. Indeed, “new” media are not newcomers to the Iranian political scene and
social movement circles. The years leading up to the 1979 revolution bear
witness to the fundamental role played by such media in galvanizing the
revolutionary process. Newly-introduced electronic devices, particularly the
transistorized audiotape machine, were of paramount importance in the
communication of religious and political messages; messages that often found
their source beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Ayatollah Khomeini,
spiritual leader of the revolution, had been exiled in 1963. His sermons and
pronouncements came in the form of audiotapes which were later transcribed
and mimeographed or Xeroxed on a massive scale (Tehranian, 1980 p. 21).
Messages entered the country in a “new media” form and diffused internally in
more traditional and paper-form media. “Small media,” as wrote SrebernyMohammadi and Mohammadi (1994), who offer the most probing and systematic
analysis of those events, contributed to a “big revolution.”
Much like the migratory nature of Khomeini’s messages from his exile in
Neauphle-le-Château into Iran, the Neda video travelled from Tehran to the world
wide web. If Khomeini’s messages were auditory by nature, the messages
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beaming out of Iran in 2009 were primarily audio-visual (videos and images) and
textual (tweets). Where audiotapes were the carrying medium of sermons, small
mobile devices stood out as the perfect medium for the transmission of live
footage from the demonstrations in the absence of mainstream media coverage.
This footage was subsequently re-transmitted via tweets on Twitter which often
provided links to YouTube videos and Flickr images. Similar to the manner in
which Khomeini’s messages were adapted from audiotapes into more traditional
communication channels, Neda’s image migrated from mobile devices, into the
web, and was eventually transformed into a poster held at worldwide street
demonstrations.

5. Conclusion: Reconsidering hypermedia
The two case-studies described in the preceding text raise several issues about
the connection between hypermedia space and political agency, and beyond
that, about the future of global communication studies. The judicious, activist use
of hypermedia space contributed to a transformatio n of the field of contention in
both Lebanon in 2005 and Iran in 2009. Hypermedia space’s importance resides
in the ways in which it combines mobility, interactivity and visibility. We can now
glimpse the contours of a theory of hypermedia in which mobile activists
interactively activate inter-media configurations that connect media old and new,
gaining visibility for their cause through a hypermedia space that is less
controllable than social space and therefore potentially subversive of the
prevalent mode of governance—something that was manifest in both Beirut and
Tehran.
A theory of hypermedia space at once foregrounds the importance of emerging
media—YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, etc—while at the same time emphasizing
that “old” media like television, the world wide web and newspapers are essential
links in hypermedia space. “New” and “old” media are therefore locked in an
inter-dependent, mutually re-enforcing, complementary relationship. In Beirut,
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text-messaging and digital cameras served to channel crucial information that
increased the visibility of the cause on television. Similarly, Neda’s story proves
that whereas YouTube and Twitter are potentially subversive tools to be utilized
by political activists, they do so only when integrated with “old” or traditional
media. The movement of images among mobile phones, computer screens, and
television screens had to link up to television to be widely diffused. Television as
an institution therefore became as much of a target of both the “Independence
Intifada” and the “Green Movement” as the scorned governments. In the case of
Iran, the #CNNfail campaign is but an example of activists seeing television as
an essential ally in their campaign. That the video of Neda had become a global
sensation cannot be attributed to YouTube alone. Al-Jazeera, CNN, and BBC, to
name a few, broadcast the video. Theirs is an essential role in the development
of the story, especially in contexts where new media technologies are still lagging
behind and television sets remain the most widely diffused medium. In Iran, out
of a population of 66,429,284, there were 32,200,000 internet users as of
September 2009, which means an internet penetration of 48.5% (Internet World
Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com

). Sysomos, a Toronto-based web

analytics company researching social media says there are only about 8,600
Twitter users whose profiles indicate they are from Iran (Schectman, June 17,
2009). Furthermore, while much commentary portrayed Iranian youth and the
internet as harbingers of democracy, a survey poll conducted by The Washington
Post showed that “only a third of Iranians even have access to the Internet, while
18-to-24-year-olds comprised the strongest voting bloc for Ahmadinejad of all
age groups” (Ballen and Doherty, June 17, 2009). Blogger Maximillian Forte
wittingly summarized the situation when he wrote: “So in this Twitter revolution,
Twitter is not representative of Internet users, Internet use is not representative
of a wider population, the youth are not representative of the youth, and the
Iranians may not even be Iranian. Fantastic indeed, this power of ‘social media’”
(June 17, 2009).
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studies depends on research that

systematically explores, explicate and theorize the ways in which a variety of
“old” and “new” media connect to each other, rather than celebrating the rise of
new media or lamenting the decline of old. However, we should be cautious not
to fetishize the technology, but to remain focused on the politically motivated
people using it and the social and political contexts—national and global—of their
action. It is here that the important issue of social agency comes to the fore.
Hypermedia space is one of the sites of social agency, because as Bolter and
Grusin argue, “[M]edia do have agency, but that agency … is constrained and
hybrid … the agency of cultural change is located on the interaction of formal,
material, and economic logics that slip into and out of the grasp of individuals and
social groups.” (Bolter & Grusin, 1999, p. 78). To follow this general line of
thinking while eschewing media determinism, we propose to think of hypermedia
as a space in which agency can be grasped when individuals and communities
activate information configurations through willful, activist action. In this sense,
we propose moving away at once from theories like media dependency and
imperialism that locate agency exclusively in the political economic structure of
media technologies, and from cultural theories of active users that posits agency
in interpretive decoding of media messages. What global communication studies
requires to remain a dynamic field, we argue, are theoretically informed,
empirically based studies that explore the social and political implications of
hypermedia space in concrete contexts.
In this regard, the connection between communicative practices and situations
on the ground needs further exploration and theorizing. One way to begin doing
that is to distinguish between information and mobilization. Iran’s “Twitter
Revolution” facilitated the exchange of information across borders; but the extent
to which it was effective in organizing demonstrations and mobilizing people to
rally remains in doubt. Was Twitter as effective an internal communication within
the movement as it was in externally promoting the movement’s aims? It could
be argued that the “public” nature of such media and their high visibility make
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them perfect for the mass diffusion of information while at the same time
rendering them ineffective in organizing clandestine operations in volatile
contexts. After all, it makes no sense for Iranian activists trying to escape
government persecution to answer Twitter’s fundamental question “what are you
doing?” by posting their next stop. Though the posting of information seems
counter-intuitive in revolutions, there were many campaigns publicizing lists of
so-called "proxy servers" that could help bypass some of the restrictions imposed
by the government of certain IP addresses. Due to over extensive publicity, the
value of such proxy servers was destroyed as the government obtained access
to them and was therefore able to ban them.
Hypermedia space provides an alternative to the rigidly controlled and monitored
social space (Kraidy, 2006). True, Facebook profile pages show what one cannot
see in Tehran’s public murals for instance; they recognize Neda as a national
martyr which she was for many Iranians. Technology enabled such a process to
take place, during which otherwise neglected actors have entered the opinionmaking game. It is by entering hypermedia space that Neda’s video has become
a sensational media product enabling the expression of a counter-state rhetoric.
But this street/Facebook dichotomy is a dangerous one as it reveals the
existence of a double-reality: a physical and a virtual one. There is a risk that as
long as the “ideal” state can be experienced in the virtual space (which is a reality
in its own right), material reality will not undergo meaningful change. Though
media alone do not produce revolutions, any revolution today cannot happen
without the media, old and new. Paradoxically, however, the very nature of new
media has eroded the notion of revolution. Producing or watching a video is not a
political act in itself. And as long as people in front of their screens are under the
illusion that they are making a contribution, a shared video is as far as a
revolution would go. In some cases, the shift of social life– through texts, images,
icons, and symbols—into hypermedia space can reflect political stagnation. In
hindsight, both Lebanon’s 2005 “Independence Intifada” and Iran’s 2009 “Green
Movement” have not led to enduring systemic political change.
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Another issue related to understanding how communication practices relate to
concrete material situation concerns issues of trust and authenticity. New social
media makes it arduous, even impossible, to determine the identity of activists.
Though this was not a major issue in Beirut’s Independence Intifada, it was
manifest in the case of Iran, when many Twitter users who are not in Iran
decided to change their time zone and set their location to Tehran in order to
protect those who are tweeting locally from government prosecution and
censorship. As a result, the number of local Iranian Twitter users and the sources
of Iran-related tweets cannot be determined. As Foreign Policy magazine blogger
Evgeny Morozov put it, “There is a huge Iranian Diaspora that […] is using social
media even more actively than their peers back in Iran. So, if the person's name
sounds Iranian, they have some content in Farsi on their blog, and are posting a
lot about events in Tehran - how do we know if they are in Tehran or, say, Los
Angeles?”

(Morozov,

June

17,

2009).

Finally,

issues

of

“noise”

and

“manipulation” must be considered. In chaotic environments like Beirut in 2005
and Tehran in 2009 where foreign governments and intelligence agencies were
involved, it is possible for external actors to reframe the movement and add their
own interpretations and opinions to the events. What, then, constitutes
“authentic” Lebanese or Iranian voices?
Finally, global communication scholars need to focus on the extent to which
widespread political contention—no matter how genuine, deeply felt, and heavily
mediated—leads to sustained social and political change. In both cases,
movements formed with telegenic demonstrators airing real grievances to gain
sympathy and support from local and global actors. Both events under study in
this essay have so far not led to permanent, institutional changes in the
Lebanese and Iranian polities. The 1979 revolution in Iran holds an important
lesson: the revolutionaries relied on audiotapes, but these were integrated into a
network of 90,000 mosques, organized around 60,000 to 200,000 mullahs and
linked to a university-based radical intelligentsia, with its underground and exile
publications (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, 1994; Tehranian, 1980,
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p.18). For hypermedia chains to be effective, they must necessarily be integrated
in pre-existing social networks and institutions to endow hypermedia space with
trust, authenticity and ultimately popular acceptance.

This confirms the

importance of contextually sensitive, empirically based, theoretically guided
studies if we are to understand the role of digital culture in global communication
studies beyond utopian platitudes fetishizing new media as reliable agents of
radical change on the one hand and dismissive knee-jerk reactions oblivious to
qualitative changes to the global media environment on the other hand.
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[1]

According to the Committee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ), 42

journalists were held in Iranian jails by July 30, 2009, most of them accused of
“sending pictures to enemy media.” For a more detailed account of the
detentions,

visit

http://cpj.org/2009/07/journalists -face-trial-in-iran-as-arrests-

continue.php
[2]

After a long absence, #IranElection bounced back into Twitter’s trending

topics at number 4 when rallies were taking place in Iran to commemorate the
31st anniversary of the Islamic revolution (The Independent , February 11, 2010).
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